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| Palpable tension in Tahrir Square as Egyptians await the result of the presidential election. |
In the afterword of my recently published book ‘From Trafalgar to
Tahrir’, I begin with the words: “There have been moments of great joy
during Egypt’s revolution, but there have also been many moments of extreme
disappointment. There have been times of great optimism and times of inordinate
pessimism. Unfortunately, the latter now outweighs the former.” This was written on 25 January 2012, exactly
one year after the initial Egyptian uprising and, unfortunately, at the time of
writing, the future continues to look bleak.
To recapitulate a little, after our unprecedented
eighteen day revolution, Egypt’s modern Pharaoh, Hosni Mubarak stepped down and
the news was greeted with a huge outburst of joy and celebration by thousands
in Cairo's Tahrir Square - the heart of the demonstrations. Mubarak charged the high council of the armed
forces to administer the affairs of the country, who promised to hand over
power to a civilian government within six months and, at that stage, we were
all filled with great hope.
However, as the months went by, it was obvious that
our transition to democracy was going to be very difficult indeed. There were many protests and demonstrations
throughout the year in which the people asked for the prosecution of representatives
of the old regime, demanded a new constitution, asked for the prime minster to
be replaced and more particularly that a speedier handover to civilians take
place. Although the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF) appeared to implement some of the political reforms
that they had promised, they only did so under a deal of public pressure. Some of the demonstrations became violent as
protestors were attacked by riot police, civilian thugs employed by the
Ministry of the Interior and military police.
However, finally and after much
heartache, Egypt held its first parliamentary elections in three stages, between
28th November 2011 and 4th January 2012. The Freedom and Justice Party, who represent the Muslim Brotherhood,
won 47.2% of lower house parliamentary seats, followed by Al Nour party who won
24.7% seats. The latter is composed of
ultra conservative Muslims whose main goal is to apply Islamic Sharia in
all aspects of life. There was a great
deal of disappointment over these results as not only were the liberals and the
members of the youth revolution almost completely sidelined, but we felt that
our worst nightmare was becoming a realisation and that the Muslim Brotherhood,
who had been suppressed for decades, were now ready to take over the country
and lead it into religious fanaticism.
From the outset it became evident that events in
the lower parliament would not run smoothly.
During the inaugural session, which was supposed to be a quiet
procedural session, there was chaos when some MPs improvised additions to the
text of the oath they were taking and this provoked angry protests from the
speaker.The oath ends with a pledge to respect the
constitution and law, but an Islamist MP added "God's law" and was
immediately emulated by other MPs.
Since then, parliament’s plenary sessions, which
were televised, grabbed the country’s attention and became something of a joke. There was continual friction as well as
clashes and outright shouting matches.
Online social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter were flooded
with comments and digital artwork depicting a parliament unable to engage in a
serious debate about the country’s democratic transition and future. For many of
us, the new parliament had little or nothing to do with our revolution and our humour
turned to embarrassment.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) has been and possibly still is the revolution’s most dangerous foe; it
has continued to show great reluctance to hand over power to the civilians.
The military have in fact ruled Egypt since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 when there
was a coup d'état by a group of army officers, led by
Abdel Nasser, who eventually, in 1956, became Egypt’s president. The revolution
was initially aimed at overthrowing King Farouk,
but the movement had more political ambitions, and soon moved to abolish the constitutional monarchy and aristocracy
of Egypt, establish a republic, and end the British
occupation of the country.
Egypt's army is, today, in control of a vast business empire covering anything from the manufacturing
of consumer goods, food, mineral water, construction, mining, land
reclamation, to tourism. In fact, it has just finished
building a massive new sports centre in the relatively new suburb called ‘New
Cairo’, where the rich and powerful, including members of SCAF have luxurious
villas. The ‘sports centre’
resembles a resort and boasts a hotel and other facilities, including an
impressive five-lane motorway, a flyover and a tunnel to ease potential traffic
congestion.
Estimates of the size of their industries vary
enormously and some say that they could account for around 40% of Egypt's gross
national product. However, no one knows
for sure as the military’s accounts are a well kept secret. What is more, the majority of Egypt's
regional governors are retired army officers and many of the big civilian
institutions and public sector corporations are run by former generals.
It is easy
to see therefore why SCAF is reluctant to relinquish power.
Nevertheless,
plans for the elections for a new president began with 23 presidential hopefuls
and the elections were due to be held on 23rd and 24th
May 2012. However, on Saturday April 14th,
the presidential commission disqualified ten of the candidates, for a variety
of reasons. Among the disqualified were
the top two Islamist contenders, Hazem Abu Ismail, an ultra-conservative
Salafist preacher and Khairat el-Shater, a multimillionaire and the Muslim Brotherhood’s
top strategist. This sent shock waves
through an already volatile political establishment and there were protests and
threats by the supporters of the Islamist candidates.
We were now left with five
major forerunners:
- · Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a physician, a long time Islamist activist and a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- · Amr Moussa, a career diplomat, foreign minister under Mubarak and secretary general of the Arab League.
- · Mohamed Morsi, an engineer and president of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom & Justice Party (FJP).
- · Hamdeen Sabahi, a Nasserite opposition figure who publicly participated in the uprising against Mubarak.
- · Ahmed Shafiq, a long time member of Mubarak’s cabinet, and a military man, who was appointed Prime Minister during the uprising. He was in fact disqualified by the election commission for his association with the former regime, but was reinstated at the last minute after an appeal. Many believe that he was the choice of the military.
The first day of the elections
dawned and a great hush descended on the streets of Cairo as, with great
excitement, people of all ages and from all walks of life made their way for
the second time in six months to the voting stations (‘lagnas’), and then
returned home to watch the outcome with bated breath. And, as informal and unofficial
results began to appear, some intriguing story lines began to emerge as well as
a number of questions. How had we so
badly overestimated Amr Moussa’s chances?
Many of us had presumed that he would be the major front runner. We had
expected Aboul Fotouh, who the Salafi community had endorsed, to do well but he
was, so far, nowhere near in the lead. Had the Salafis abandoned him? Mohamed Morsi seemed to be doing well, were
our worst fears therefore going to be realised and would Egypt be ruled by an
Islamist President? How was it that
Ahmed Shafiq, the candidate most closely aligned with Mubarak was also gaining
many votes? But perhaps the biggest
question of all and the one that seemed to be upending all predictions was the reason
for the sudden rise of Hamdeen Sabahi, who was twice a member of parliament
during the Mubarak era and who had been jailed 17 times. Although Sabahi’s surge in popularity during
the weeks running up to the elections was palpable on the streets of Cairo and
Alexandria, he was dismissed by many analysts who considered that he had little
chance of gaining a significant number of votes and in fact initial results
showed that his was lagging far behind the others.
Yet, quite suddenly during the second day of the
voting, it became evident that he could be vying with Shafiq for second place, while
Morsi was in the lead. Indeed, the final
results were very close, with Morsi obtaining 24.77% vote, Shafik 23.66% and
Sabahi 20.7%.
There were by now many rumours of electoral
violations and, despite a public outpouring of frustration and the
lodging of appeals, the Electoral Commission announced that there would be a
run-off between Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq which, as previously mentioned,
was Egypt’s worst nightmare. This led to
suggestions that either Morsi or Shafiq should withdraw from the elections in
order for Sabahi to compete in the run-off.
We were between the devil and the deep blue sea – an Islamist president
or a president from the old regime.
After much wrangling and little awareness of what
was going on behind closed doors, on Saturday 16 June and 17 June, voters went
to the poles for the first competitively elected leader in Egypt’s history, facing a
stark choice between Morsi and Shafiq.
However, much to everyone’s surprise the night before the run-off, SCAF,
acting under a last minute ruling from the Supreme Constitutional Court,
dissolved the Parliament and declared that it would be the sole lawmakers even
after the election of a new president. The military then began to draw up a new
interim constitution that would define the power of the president and there was
emerging evidence that the future president would have as little authority as
the Queen of England and would simply be a figurehead.
Speculation and rumours were rife! The fact that the military had seized
Parliament ruled out the possibility of the Islamists controlling the
legislature and the presidency. This could
mean that if Morsi won the presidency he would face a lengthy battle for power
with the generals. On the other hand, if
Shafiq won, he could become a military-backed authoritarian in the same manner
as Mubarak.
Meanwhile, and in the run up to the second round of
elections, it became obvious that there was less enthusiasm than there had been
for previous rounds of voting. We were
all totally disenchanted with the choice of candidates and there were calls in
the streets, on the social media and by word of mouth to either boycott the
elections or to hand in spoiled ballots.
There were many heated debates, particularly on Facebook, and a number
of accusations that by boycotting the elections, we would simply be handing the
power to Morsi.
Somewhat reluctantly, the people went to the poles
and voted. Many, however, voted against
their least favourite of the two rather that in support of either of the
candidates. By the end of Saturday,
Morsi was already beginning to claim victory and shortly afterwards Shafiq
retaliated with a similar declaration.
The final results from the Higher Presidential
Election Commission (HPEC) were due to be announced on 21 June but on Wednesday
20 June Egyptian election officials announced that they were postponing the
results with the excuse that they needed time to look into a number of charges
of electoral abuse. This surprise delay
intensified the feelings of anxiety and consternation that we had been
suffering night and day and also aggravated the power struggle between the
Brotherhood and SCAF.
After almost a week of an anxious, nail-biting,
anticipation we heard that the final results would be announced on Saturday 23
June. However, no such announcement was
made but, that evening there was a declaration that, further to one of many
meetings between the generals and the Islamists, Farouk Sultan, head of the
Presidential Elections Commission, would personally broadcast the results the
following day, Sunday 24 June, at 3.00 p.m.
In the interim, there were widespread rumours of
Mubarak’s declining health after he was sentenced to life in prison for
complicity in the killing of protesters during the uprising. He appeared to be fluctuating between life
and death and on several occasions was declared ‘clinically dead’. So varied were the reports that we became
somewhat cynical and began to feel that they were all a fabrication to take our
minds off possible further delays in the election results.
Nevertheless, after a sleepless night, Sunday
dawned and there was an eerie hush on the streets of Cairo. The waiting was almost intolerable and much
speculation began when we learned that security had been tightened in many
areas in Cairo Security, with tanks and riot police deployed around the
commission's headquarters and armoured vehicles and troops at the exits and
entrances to Cairo airport. Some Muslim Brotherhood officials had indeed made veiled
threats of confrontation should Shafiq win the presidency and many Egyptian
liberals were troubled by the recent violence by the hardline Islamists in
Tunisia.
The tightening of security appeared to signify that
the army already knew the result and that they were taking suitable precautions. This quite naturally led us to believe that
Shafiq had won the election. In the meantime,
thousands of Morsi supporters gathered in Tahrir Square, where they urged SCAF
to respect the will of the people, chanting "revolution, revolution until
victory." Government employees were advised to leave early, which was
another sign of the security precautions being taken, while shops closed almost
as soon as they had opened as people hurried home to watch the decisive news
conference on television.
Most of us were sitting anxiously and fearfully in
front of our TV sets well before the allocated time of the results. At 3.00 p.m. we were shown the interior of a
room at the election commission’s headquarters where a few people were milling
round, while others were seated facing a long table on a podium with five empty
chairs. And we waited! After many more anxious minutes a 30 minute
delay in the results was announced.
While we continued to wait, many of us were
chatting on Facebook, tweeting, texting and talking on the phone, sometimes
almost simultaneously, discussing what could possibility be causing the
delay. Finally, at 3.45 p.m. Farouk
Sultan and four other members of the commission took their places and the empty
chairs were filled. Sultan was holding a
large tome of papers and his address, which lasted over an hour, prompted
increasing frustration. Indeed, as
people waited impatiently, many of them resorted to describing their agony on
the social media. Sultan explained the
process and tried to convince his audience of the accuracy and legitimacy of
the results, and then gave a full review of voting irregularities. Our anxiety increased as he explained that
the commission had received 456 appeals from both candidates and listened to
their defence for six hours, resulting in a recount of the ballots of some of
the polling stations. He further
elaborated by citing all the appeals and explaining how they affected the
results. As he detailed the thousands of
votes for both Shafiq and Morsi that had been cancelled, we attempted to
calculate the final results.
When the tension became almost too much to bear,
Sultan finally announced that the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi
had won the election with a margin of 53.73%.
And, while the Morsi supporters in Tahrir Square became hysterical with
joy, Shafiq’s campaigners were, dismayed and in utter disbelief.
We now found ourselves with no constitution, no
parliament and a president with no right to command his own country's army and
what immediately became clear was that Morsi, in spite of being given an
historic opportunity, will face enormous challenges. He will need to face the generals and may
possibly fall out with them; he will have to overcome the doubts of almost half
the voters and the millions who either boycotted the voting, spoiled the votes
or simply lost interest in the whole process; he will also have to convince the
country that he represents a lot more than the interests of the Muslim
Brotherhood. This is a man, who was the
Brotherhood’s second choice, who during his campaign alternated between
promoting himself as a liberal and as a defender of strict religious values and
who, despite allegedly having gained a PhD in the States, possesses a poor
grasp of the English language. Above
all, he will have to reach out to and allay the fears of the millions of
Christians who, unofficially, make up ten percent of the population.
Indeed, Morsi’s signing in as president was not an auspicious
start as he had pledged that he would take the oath in Parliament but, because it
had been dissolved, he was forced to swear in before a court of judges, many of
whom had been appointed by Mubarak.
Morsi’s first major problem reared its ugly head almost
immediately when he pushed for the reinstatement of Parliament in defiance of the
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). However,
after a deal of wrangling and what was expected to be an enormous showdown, Morsi
and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party finally backed down.
We now await future developments with bated breath.
